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RESEARCH ARTICLE
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Abstract
Oncology-associated adverse drug/device reactions can be fatal. Some clinicians who treat
single patients with severe oncology-associated toxicities have researched case series and
published this information. We investigated motivations and experiences of select individu-
als leading such efforts. Clinicians treating individual patients who developed oncology-
associated serious adverse drug events were asked to participate. Inclusion criteria
included having index patient information, reporting case series, and being collaborative
with investigators from two National Institutes of Health funded pharmacovigilance net-
works. Thirty-minute interviews addressed investigational motivation, feedback from phar-
maceutical manufacturers, FDA personnel, and academic leadership, and
recommendations for improving pharmacovigilance. Responses were analyzed using con-
stant comparative methods of qualitative analysis. Overall, 18 clinicians met inclusion crite-
ria and 14 interviewees are included. Primary motivations were scientific curiosity,
expressed by six clinicians. A less common theme was public health related (three clini-
cians). Six clinicians received feedback characterized as supportive from academic leaders,
while four clinicians received feedback characterized as negative. Three clinicians reported
that following the case series publication they were invited to speak at academic institutions
worldwide. Responses from pharmaceutical manufacturers were characterized as negative
by 12 clinicians. One clinician’s wife called the post-reporting time the “Maalox month,” while
another clinician reported that the manufacturer collaboratively offered to identify additional
cases of the toxicity. Responses from FDA employees were characterized as collaborative
for two clinicians, neutral for five clinicians, unresponsive for negative by six clinicians.
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Three clinicians endorsed developing improved reporting mechanisms for individual physi-
cians, while 11 clinicians endorsed safety activities that should be undertaken by persons
other than a motivated clinician who personally treats a patient with a severe adverse drug/
device reaction. Our study provides some of the first reports of clinician motivations and
experiences with reporting serious or potentially fatal oncology-associated adverse drug or
device reactions. Overall, it appears that negative feedback from pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and mixed feedback from the academic community and/or the FDA were reported.
Big data, registries, Data Safety Monitoring Boards, and pharmacogenetic studies may facil-
itate improved pharmacovigilance efforts for oncology-associated adverse drug reactions.
These initiatives overcome concerns related to complacency, indifference, ignorance, and
system-level problems as barriers to documenting and reporting adverse drug events- barri-
ers that have been previously reported for clinician reporting of serious adverse drug
reactions.
Introduction
Oncology-associated adverse drug/device reactions are serious medical toxicities. These toxici-
ties encompass three areas. Oncology drugs are the most toxic pharmaceutical class [1,2].
Oncology patients are ill, with comorbid illnesses, extensive cancer, and undergoing toxic
treatments. When adverse reactions occur that represent severe oncology-drug induced gas-
trointestinal toxicity, arterial or venous thromboembolism, cardiac arrhythmias, opportunistic
infections, or hemorrhage, these events are frequently attributed to the cancer, comorbid ill-
ness, or the “cost of doing business.” [3–6] A second toxicity type relates to oncology-drug
induced growth or dissemination of existing cancers- as with erythropoiesis stimulating agents
or morcellator procedures.[7,8] A third type relates to new cancer development as postulated
with natalizumab associated melanoma or protein pump inhibitors associated gastric malig-
nancies.[9,10] Two National Institutes Health R01 funded pharmacovigilance programs (the
Southern Network on Adverse Reactions (SONAR) and the Research on Adverse Drug Events
and Reports (RADAR), projects), conducted beginning in 1998, have collaborated with clini-
cians to report > 50 serious adverse drug/device reactions from the oncology setting.[3,6]
These co-investigators are aware of efforts of academic collaborators who also reported similar
serious oncology-associated adverse drug reactions. SONAR and RADAR co-investigators and
colleagues have personally treated oncology patients who developed several life-threatening
adverse drug reactions, evaluated these patients, and published on the cause and cases of these
toxicities. These investigations were frequently followed by label warnings and/or convening
of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Advisory Committee reviews of safety findings. Cli-
nicians who take “extra-steps” of evaluating serious adverse drug reactions and reporting this
in medical publications may be subject to repercussions or alternatively, career enhancements.
Our purpose is to shed light on motivations and experiences of clinicians who worked with
investigator leaders of two National Institutes supported pharmacovigilance networks and
who also personally evaluated and reported unrecognized serious adverse drug reactions.
Materials and methods
Our study is a qualitative analysis of experiences who collaborate with leaders of two NIH
funded pharmaceutical safety grants and subsequently published case series of serious
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oncology-associated (adverse drug reactions). The ADRs were initially seen as an individual
case by the interviewed clinician. We used “The Criteria for reporting qualitative research
(COREQ): a 32-item checklist for interviews and focus groups” to guide the design, analysis,
and reporting of our study.[11] As recommended by the COREQ guidelines, the qualitative
researchers in this study varied in credentials, training, occupation, and training. The principal
investigator was a qualitative analyst PhD researcher. A senior co-investigator/interviewer was
a MD PhD health services researcher/policy endowed chair professor who had previously pub-
lished physicians reporting of health care fraud, and another co-investigator was a JD PhD
health policy tenured professor who had conducted qualitative and quantitative research,
including one manuscript on physicians reporting of health care fraud. The theoretical frame-
work was based on an exploratory approach to support hypothesis generation- relevant con-
siderations since there are no published data about clinician experiences with identifying and
reporting case series of serious adverse-drug reactions. The analytic focus was based on quanti-
tative analysis and systematic organization of data into a structured format.
No repeat interviews were conducted. After 14 interviews were conducted and the
responses analyzed, the Principal Investigator, the co-Principal Investigator, and the study
team jointly determined that saturation had occurred. Transcripts were not returned to the
interviewees, but were reviewed by the co-Principal Investigator. Data coding and transcrip-
tion were done by four research assistants, with two research assistants independently coding
and transcribing each interview. The co-Principal Investigator provided to the research assis-
tants the agreed upon coding terms that guided transcript analysis. Themes were derived in
advance, based in part on personal experiences of the co-Principal Investigator treating per-
sons with serious oncology-associated adverse drug reactions and subsequently reporting this
information in the medical literature. Since the interview transcript size was small (about five
pages per interview), no software analysis package was used. Participants reviewed the draft
manuscript (prior to submission) and were asked to provide relevant feedback, particularly if
each interviewee did not express concerns about linking of responses to individual interview-
ees. Quotations were presented to illustrate each of the selected themes. Participant numbers
are included in the quotations. The data and the findings exhibited strong consistency, as
assessed by the study investigators. The major themes are presented in each table and in the
corresponding text. Minor themes are also highlighted in the tables and the text. Overall, the
research team, study design, and analysis/findings were consistent with the 32 consolidated
criteria for reporting qualitative studies (COREQ).[11] The details of the process are shown in
a flow chart in Fig 1.
The qualitative approach was chosen as it is a rigorous approach for investigating personal
motivations, reflections, and outcomes among a small group of persons who have a common
experience.[12] Qualitative methods are also considered appropriate for studies that provider
exploratory research and hypothesis generation. These are appropriate considerations as there
are no prior research publications that report on clinician motivations for publishing serious
adverse drug reaction information. The study received approval from the University of South
Carolina Institutional Review Board. All participants provided verbal consent.
The operational definition of serious adverse drug reactions were events attributed by the
reporting clinician as causing death or potentially fatal organ toxicity. Publication dates are
redacted to ensure clinician anonymity. Most reports were followed by boxed warnings and/or
FDA Advisory Committees. The study interviewer was an MD PhD MPP interviewer whose
research focused on pharmaceutical safety research and impacts of this work on academic cli-
nicians who report serious adverse drug reactions. This interviewer was trained by an experi-
enced qualitative research journalism professor who also conducted the first interview as part
of the training session. The interview guide was developed by the experienced qualitative
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researcher. (S1 Interview Guide) The guide underwent field review by three additional PhD
health services researchers with expertise in drug safety. The guide contained a list of key the-
matic areas to be probed for clarification and additional detail for each of four pre-selected
topic areas- interviewee views of responses by employees of the pharmaceutical manufacturers,
employees of the FDA, and clinicians in academic medical centers and recommendations that
the interviewee considered as relevant for future pharmacovigilance efforts. All interviews
were recorded and transcribed. No interviewee requested a copy of the interview guide prior
to the interview. The interviewer also kept written notes. The interview began by obtaining
verbal informed consent, followed by demographic and professional information on the inter-
viewee. Next, we elicited information on the nature of the work that led to identification of the
index case of the serious adverse drug reaction and to their follow-on work to establish a case
series. Interviews then proceeded chronologically through the following topics: the interview-
ees personal assessment of responses to the study findings by employees of the relevant phar-
maceutical manufacturer, safety personnel of the FDA, clinicians in academia at either the
home institution of the interviewee or an academic institution where the interviewee had
applied for a possible academic position, and recommendations by the interviewee that might
be considered when future studies evaluate potential serious adverse drug reactions. Interview-
ees were asked to verify that they had not participated in any “whistle blower” investigation
and had not received any income for publishing their work.
We analyzed interview transcripts using standard coding techniques and the constant com-
parative methods of qualitative analysis, based on methods reported previously.[13,14,15] The
two senior investigators independently analyzed the interviews and developed separate coding
schemes for organization the data. Coding schemes were then compared, discussed, and rec-
onciled to product a final coding structure which consisted for six broad themes covering 20
specific codes. One investigator (CLB) then used the final coding scheme to code all of the
transcripts and interview notes, with input from each of the four transcribers. The transcripts
and interview notes were coded using manual counts for each of the 20 specific codes. The
Fig 1. Flow chart for study inclusion criteria.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219521.g001
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analysis focused on organizing and describing themes, including distinctions among clinicians
based on their academic training (clinician/PhD versus clinician) and level of training (fellow
or student versus assistant or associate professor).
Results
We identified 18 eligible persons for interview. Three interviewed persons were excluded as
they did not have first-hand information on index cases. One clinician who was working at a
pharmaceutical corporation did not return telephone calls. We conducted semi-structured
30-minute telephone interviews at the workplace with persons who we identified as clinicians
who were collaborators with a key investigator of SONAR and RADAR projects or who collab-
orated closely with a senior RADAR/SONAR co-investigator, had evaluated a case of a serious
oncology-associated adverse drug reaction, personally conducted research to identify cases of
persons with this toxicity, and then published the findings in peer-reviewed medical journals
or, in one case, presented findings to FDA personnel. The study sample was felt to be exhaus-
tive of all individuals who met the entry criteria. All but one of the 15 eligible participants were
interviewed- the lone exception had left academic medicine and could not be contacted. The
contacted clinician received an email querying if there would be interest, then a phone call
from the study co-Principal Investigator confirming interest in participation, and then was
emailed a study description that included a consent form. A telephone interview was con-
ducted with the study participants with a research assistant taking notes and taking the conver-
sation and the co-Principal Investigator and the interviewee speaking for about 30 minutes.
Three potential participants were not involved in clinical medicine. The characteristics of the
interviewed persons are outlined in [Table 1]. The interview guide was developed by a journal-
ism PhD collaborator with extensive expertise in qualitative research and telephone-based
interview studies. Interviews lasted a median of 35.5 minutes (interquartile range, 30 to 40
minutes) addressed clinician motivation and experiences. All of the 14 included transcripts
were found to have> 98% concordance.
Overall, data were included from 12 clinicians who had personally treated a patient who
developed a serious and previously unreported serious adverse drug reaction, one clinician
whose wife died from a previously unrecognized adverse device reaction, and one MD PhD
student whose mentor had treated the index patient. Five clinicians had MD/PhD or DDS/
PhD degrees, one clinician was enrolled in an MD/PhD program, and six clinicians had
extensive basic and/or clinical science training. The sample included six medical oncologists,
one radiation oncologist, one oncology PharmD, five surgeons, and one MD PhD student
who worked closely with an oncologist oncology mentor. Studies were initiated following
review of a single case (n = 3) or after treating between four and 65 cases with the relevant
toxicity (n = 11), or after reviewing clinical trial data involving for 350 and 800 patients in
two phase III clinical trials (n = 2). Six reports were single-site case series, two were phase II
single-site clinical trial reports, one was a meta-analysis, two were phase III clinical trial
reports, and three were observational studies from a small number of academic medical
centers.
Investigators included one medical student, three oncology fellows, and 10 clinicians who
were assistant/associate professors at academic medical centers when the case series was evalu-
ated. Adverse drug reactions included fatal infections of the central nervous system (n = 1),
bone osteonecrosis (n = 3), tumor progression/development (n = 5), arterial or venous throm-
boembolism (n = 3), cardiac arrythmias (n = 1), or fatal gastrointestinal toxicity (n = 1). Five
studies were disseminated in four high-impact factor medical journals (JAMA, Lancet, Annals
of Internal Medicine, and New England Journal of Medicine), five studies were disseminated
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in two high-impact factor hematology-oncology journals (Blood and the Journal of Clinical
Oncology), two studies were disseminated in two surgical specialty journals, one study was dis-
seminated in a lower impact-factor oncology journal, and one study was disseminated by the
Government Accountability Organization.[8]
Table 1. Table of adverse drug reactions.
Training
(# Patients with Toxicity)
(# Study Sites)
Estimated
Rate
FDA Meeting
Convened
Disseminated in High-Impact
Factor Medical Journal�
Boxed Warning Added
to Product Label
Discovery
Oncologist MD PhD
(60 Pts)
(Multi-Site Observational Study)
1 in 10,000 Yes Yes Fatal Brain Infection-
Monoclonal Antibody
Surgeon MD PhD
(10 Pts)
(Multi-Site Observational Study)
1 in 350 Yes Yes Device—Metastatic Cancer
Oncologist MD
(10 Pts)
(Phase III NCI Sponsored Clinical
Trial)
1 in 6 Yes Yes Yes Fatal Gastrointestinal Toxicity
Surgeon DDS
(20 Pts)
(Single-Site Observational Study)
1 in 100 Yes Yes Bone Necrosis
Oncologist MD
(10 Pts)
(Single-Site Observational Study)
1 in 25 Yes Secondary Cancer
Surgeon DDS PhD
(40 Pts)
(Single-Site Observational Study)
1 in 100 Yes Yes Bone Necrosis
Oncologist MD
(110 Pts)
(Phase III Industry Sponsored
Clinical Trial)
1 in 10 Yes Yes Yes Tumor Progression
Surgeon MD DMD
(70 Pts)
(Single-Site Observational Study)
1 in 100 Yes Yes Bone Necrosis
Surgeon MD PhD
(340 Pts)
(Meta-Analysis)
1 in 4 Yes Yes Yes Tumor Progression
Oncologist MD
(30 Pts)
(Single Site Observational Study)
1 in 3 Yes Arterial Vascular Toxicity
MD PhD Student
(10 Pts)
(Multi-Site Observational Study)
Not available New Cancer Development
Oncologist MD PhD
(10 Pts)
(Industry Sponsored Clinical Sites
in a Phase III Clinical Trial)
Not available Yes Cardiac Toxicity
Oncologist MD
(10 Pts)
(Single Site Observational Study)
1 in 5 Yes Yes Venous Thromboembolism
Pharmacist PharmD
(20 Pts)
(Single Site NCI Sponsored Clinical
Trial Study)
1 in 5 Venous Thromboembolism
�High impact factor medical journals included the New England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Association, the Annals of Internal
Medicine, Blood, the Journal of Clinical Oncology, and the Journal of the National Cancer Institute
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219521.t001
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Following dissemination of safety findings for eleven and seven studies, respectively, boxed
warnings were added to product labels and FDA advisory committees were convened. Related
peer-reviewed publications were cited in medical publications a median of 1,114 times (range
290 to 2,500 for 13 reports) or in national newspapers (for 7 reports). The median estimated
incidence of the adverse events was 1 in 6 treated patients (range 1 in 3 to 1 in 10,000 (13
reports)). Five described toxicities that were fatal. Following seven adverse drug reaction
reports, phase III clinical trials were temporarily discontinued while additional safety evalua-
tions were conducted. For one toxicity, a manufacturer voluntarily discontinued manufactur-
ing the implicated device. Seven study reports were submitted to the FDA for additional
review, and 10 investigators submitted related findings to pharmaceutical manufacturers.
[Table 1]
Motivations
All but one of the clinicians intended to publish the findings, generally aiming for publication
in a top-tier medical journal or medical/surgical specialty journal. One clinician retained attor-
neys who filed a device liability lawsuit against a manufacturer and submitted safety data to the
FDA, but did not submit safety data to a peer-reviewed journal. Reported motivations coa-
lesced around five non-mutually exclusive themes: scientific curiosity, public health, a desire
to inform the broad medical community of a toxicity that had not been reported previously,
ethics, and because the toxicity had affected a clinician’s wife.
The most common theme, scientific curiosity, was linked by six clinicians to their training
as a clinician scientist. One clinician reported that “the MD side of me identified the toxicity
and the PhD side of me facilitated my scientific investigation of the causes of the toxicity”.
Another clinician reported that “as a MD PhD investigator, this is the kind of science that I
have been trained to do”. Three clinicians reported that training as clinician scientists led to
the investigation. Five of six clinicians who reported scientific curiosity as the main motivator
were investigators of National Cancer Institute-sponsored or pharmaceutical manufacturer
funded investigator-initiated trials.
A less common theme was public health related, with three clinicians reporting that toxicity
findings had public health implications that they felt was their responsibility to report. One cli-
nician said “what got me personally was seeing the denials of this information and the callous
disregard [of the pharmaceutical manufacturer] for this complication”. A third theme, ethics,
was endorsed by two clinicians. One clinician cited the Belmont Report as a motivating factor.
One clinician, endorsing personal reasons for toxicity evaluation, stated that “I have to tell you
without a question if this problem had not happened to us [the clinician’s spouse died from
the toxicity], I would have probably agreed that this was a problem but I wouldn’t have done
anything more than that. As many of my colleagues did”. [Table 2]
Responses by the academic community
The academic community was reported as being supportive for six clinicians, unfavorable
towards four clinicians, and neutral towards two clinicians. Three clinicians reported that fol-
lowing the publishing of their case series, they were invited to speak at academic institutions
worldwide. One clinician reported “Well, the chairman of my department said this is really sig-
nificant. . .I say, well, mostly, he was right”. In contrast, two clinicians reported that during job
interviews, a senior academic interviewer indicated that reporting of the serious adverse drug
reactions would not be an academic pursuit that should be continued. One clinician stated
“the chairman where I interviewed said you will not make friends with this kind of research”.
Caveat medicus
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Two clinicians were not comfortable sharing information about responses that they had
received from the medical community. [Table 3]
Reponses by the pharmaceutical community
The pharmaceutical community was generally negative towards the clinicians, although two cli-
nicians reported collaborative responses. One clinician said that his wife called the post-reporting
time the “Maalox month”–primarily in response to intimidation by a physician employed by a
pharmaceutical manufacturer. Another clinician met with the Chief Executive Officer of the rele-
vant pharmaceutical manufacturer who said he wanted to see “in person the [expletive] who had
cost us $2 billion”. A third clinician was sued by the pharmaceutical device manufacturer. Safety
findings were subsequently central aspect of legal settlements paid by a manufacturer to the
Department of Justice of $600 million (two clinicians) and $300 million (two clinicians),
although these clinicians did not receive financial rewards. One clinician reported that the
Table 2. Primary motivations for publishing adverse drug reactions.
Primary
Motivation
Illustrative Remark
Scientific
Curiosity
(6 Participants)
“I did it because it was important. Well, so I did it because it was a curiosity to me
scientifically. But, having done an MD/PhD, this is the space that I’m supposed to be in.” (P12)
“First of all, I’m a scientist. I’m a doctor, a medical doctor.” (P9)
“It was just the love of the game, just pure intellectual curiosity.” (P13)
“I think my passion for knowledge and sharing that knowledge, not just with the medical
community, but I also really want this information to be disseminated.” (P14)
“I take sort of a scientific bend towards thinking about the patients, you know, both in terms of
how we treat them clinically and sort of biologically understanding them.” (P15)
Medical
Awareness
(2 Participants)
“I think the main thing was that I hope that the profession understands that we have a role in
this whole business of medications.” (P5)
“I was worried that something bad would happen to people . . .” (P16)
Ethics
(2 Participants)
“So, in the end, our responsibility as investigators is to each individual patient enrolled in the
trial, based on the Belmont Report.” (P4)
“What got me going personally was seeing the denials of this information and their callous
disregard for this complication.” (P7)
Public Health
(3 Participants)
“I think it was really about wanting transparency around this [toxicity].” (P1)
“Well, I think it was public health because a lot of people were taking this drug. So, I thought it
was important for them to realize that there was a potential problem.” (P10)
Personal
(1 Participant)
“I have to tell you without a question if this had not happened to us (my wife and I), I would
have probably agreed this was a problem, but I wouldn’t have done anything more than that.
As many of my colleagues did.” (P2)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219521.t002
Table 3. Interviewee report of academic community response.
Type of
Response
Illustrative Remark
Positive
(6 Participants)
“Well, the chairman of my department said this is really significant. . . This is going to be
something that is going to be really, really significant. I say, mostly, he was right.” (P10)
“The university had my back.” (P6)
“I speak [by invitation] (on this) all over the world.” (P7)
“My institution was very supportive.” (P16)
Neutral
(2 Participants)
“Everyone was kind of happy, but not anything major. They said, ‘OK good publication. Good
guy, fine job. What’s next?” (P9)
“My chairman saw the paper and [said] ‘you’re taking on [a large pharmaceutical company]. . ..
It’s a billion dollar drug for them. . .so it’s going to hurt their bottom line.’” (P12)
Negative
(4 Participants)
“The chairman said you will not make friends with this kind of research.” (P1)
“I spent the next six years without giving academic talks.” (P13)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219521.t003
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manufacturer collaboratively offered to identify additional cases of the relevant toxicity that were
in the manufacturer’s safety database. One clinician reported that the relevant manufacturer was
fairly negative, while a competitive manufacturer placed this person on an academic advisory
panel and sponsored the clinician to meet with safety representatives of the FDA. [Table 4]
Responses by the FDA
FDA responses were characterized as collaborative for two clinicians, neutral for five clini-
cians, unresponsive for two clinicians, and negative for six clinicians. One of these instances
was described as collaborative and negative. Some persons at the FDA worked with the clini-
cian to facilitate market withdrawal of the implicated device. Other FDA persons were
reported as being unresponsive although other clinicians had previously reported device-asso-
ciated deaths to the FDA. One clinician reported that FDA safety officials were not responsive
because he/she “practiced in a foreign country, and that FDA safety officials appeared to be
more responsive to United States’ clinicians”. One clinician reported that the response was vig-
orous and positive- the FDA convened an independent auditing panel to review the safety
findings. One clinician who had submitted >60 reports to FDA’s MedWatch database was sur-
prised when no follow-up from FDA personnel occurred. [Table 5]
Recommendations for going forward
Five major concepts were endorsed for improving drug safety going forward. Three clinicians
endorsed developing improved reporting mechanisms for individual physicians (n = 3). Eleven
clinicians endorsed safety activities that should be undertaken by persons other than a
Table 4. Interviewee report of pharmaceutical company response.
Pharmaceutical
Perceptions
Illustrative Remark
Collaborative
(2 Participants)
“I really do commend the company that I worked with because as a ‘fellow’, which is not
even a full-fledged physician, I was on the phone with a senior person of the company
discussing what I was thinking. They facilitated me getting my hands on a number of
cases that they had seen.” (P1)
“I think we’re working toward getting more information out there about [this
toxicity]. . .I think they [pharma] would like to do further investigation.” (P13)
Negative
(12 Participants)
“The second communication I got was a threat from their executive vice president that I
would be sued for defamation.” (P2)
“When our paper came out, they actually tried to discredit me. There was an interview
that they gave to a New York Times reporter, where they said [my report] was flawed.
And they actually called some of my colleagues and asked them if they knew dirt on
me.” (P4)
“They [the manufacturers] escaped litigation with disclaimers on television. . .I was very
naive thinking they [pharma] were upstanding. . .” (P7)
“I met with the scientific people from [the company] and we discussed the data. A knock
on the door occurred and the CEO walked in, looked at me and said, ‘I just want to look
at the [expletive] who lost us 2 billion dollars.’ Then he walked out.” (P9)
“They had this white document [about the toxicity] and they didn’t distribute it . . .The
only people who knew about [the toxicity] were a few oncologists who had some
concerns about [the toxicity].” (P5)
“[The company], particularly, didn’t want hear about negative stuff.” (P10)
“I think their goal is more based on financial incentive rather than solely looking out for
the benefit of the patient.” (P14)
“I think they were unbelievably corrupted when it came to this from an ethical
prospective. And it became even worse when we found out that a year prior to the
complication another woman was harmed using the same technique, and that she was
actually on her deathbed when my wife had the operation. I learned that they had had
extensive conversations internally and chose to do nothing to protect patients.” (P2)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219521.t004
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motivated clinician who personally treats a patient with a severe adverse drug/device reaction,
including supporting independent pharmaceutical watchdog organizations (3 clinicians), ret-
rospective FDA-funded safety analyses (one clinician), novel scientific studies including phar-
macogenetics (two clinicians), big data analytics (two clinicians), or improved data safety
monitoring boards (one clinician). One of the recommendations supported mandatory safety
review of all drugs five years after FDA approval has been granted. One clinician noted that
since his/her events were reported, pharmaceutical safety efforts had improved markedly—
with widespread utilization of Data Safety Monitoring Boards. Two participants did not
endorse any specific recommendation for future safety efforts.
Discussion
This study of 14 clinicians who have published reports of, or potentially fatal oncology associ-
ated adverse drug/device reactions found that responses of the relevant pharmaceutical manu-
facturer were primarily negative, responses by fellow academic clinicians were generally
supportive or neutral, and responses by FDA personnel were supportive in only two instances.
The clinical findings were significant, with many reports being published in high-impact med-
ical journals, being described in revised product labels and in “Dear Doctor” letters, and in
four instances, being associated with settlements by pharmaceutical manufacturers for> $900
million. In interpreting our findings, several factors should be considered.
The most common motivation was scientific curiosity. This was reported by three of the
five PhD clinicians as well as the MD/PhD student who indicated that the physician back-
ground facilitated recognition of the toxicity and the PhD background facilitated detailed basic
science investigation. In one instance, a clinician reported the toxicity after his wife had devel-
oped device-associated metastatic sarcoma (and ultimately died from this toxicity). There are
no prior studies in the published literature that report on motivations of clinicians to publish
their investigations of adverse drug reactions that they have observed in clinical practice. Kes-
selheim et al. reported that whistle-blowers who report on possible fraud by their employers,
including four persons who reported that safety data had not been appropriately disseminated,
focused on integrity, altruism or public safety, justice, and self-preservation as motivating fac-
tors.[13] Formal clinical trial training resulted in one clinician invoking principles of the Bel-
mont Report as part of the impetus for pursuing investigation of potential causes of these
serious adverse drug reactions.
Table 5. Interviewee report of fda employee response.
FDA Responses Illustrative Remark
Positive
Collaboration
(2 Participants)
“Well, I think the FDA responded very responsively and I have to credit [one senior FDA
person] for many things. One of the things I credited him/her for is that [he/she] took this
seriously.” (P1)
Neutral
Collaboration
(5 Participants)
“They know what we’re doing. They smile . . .”
“I remember three years later, when I did a poster [presentation], somebody from the FDA
came by and wanted to talk to me about [the toxicity—three years after my report].” (P14)
Zero/Unresponsive
(2 Participants)
“No, I never got a call from the FDA.” (P5)
Negative
Collaboration
(6 Participants)
“Unfortunately, I don’t think this had been a major funding priority for the FDA.” (P13)
“I think in the end, FDA’s actions and the commissioner’s actions were extremely weak. If a
can of soup or food product is causing a mortality risk at a rate of 1 in 350 and the FDA
believes that, they would immediately pull that product off the market.” (P2)
“I had that one meeting with the FDA. . . They were more and more focusing on American
scientists [which I am not]. . .” (P9)
“Unfortunately, the FDA seems to have bought the Kool-Aid on the drug.” (P7)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219521.t005
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Twelve clinicians reported that they had received negative feedback personally or profes-
sionally. This too mirrors findings reported for pharmaceutical whistleblowers.[13] Similar
experiences have been reported by clinicians who reported rofecoxib-associated cardiac mor-
tality, gadolinium-associated nephrogenic systemic fibrosis, and even aspirin-associated Reye’s
syndrome.[16] Kesselheim suggested that for pharmaceutical whistleblowers, ensuring respon-
sible “whistle-blowing” would require interventions that strengthen penalties against retalia-
tion.[11] Similarly, for clinicians, protection against retaliations from pharmaceutical
manufacturers are needed. In some instances, this might include financial support if lawsuits
against the clinician are filed in an effort to derail the scientific investigation of serious toxicity.
It should be noted that reporting safety findings to the FDA was not a route chosen by 12
clinicians. One clinician who submitted > 60 individual adverse event reports to FDA’s Med-
Watch program did not receive any feedback from the FDA. While only 1% to 10% of all seri-
ous adverse drug reactions are estimated to be reported to the FDA, it is undoubtedly even
more rare for a clinician to undertake a detailed investigation of safety data for a large series of
patient with the suspected toxicity and then report this information in peer-reviewed medical
publications [17]. In one instance, the reporting clinician received a R01 grant from the
National Institutes of Health to conduct basic science studies of the toxicity.
In three personal stories we heard, feedback from fellow academics was negative. As sug-
gested by some policy makers, physicians should be able to anonymously report their safety
findings to regulatory authorities. This anonymity is not possible with peer-reviewed publica-
tions. Extensive influence of pharmaceutical manufacturers on academic communities is con-
cerning, as noted in the high rate of physicians with extensive pharmaceutical funding who
participate in FDA Advisory Committee meetings and on medical society-sponsored clinical
guideline panels. This influence undoubtedly spills over into academic and FDA environments.
Fourth, personal experience of the clinician interviewees to recommendations for improv-
ing pharmaceutical safety are informative. The FDA endorses some of these recommendations
with its support of the SENTINEL big-data initiative, which has yielded important safety find-
ings.[18] An important recommendation is for the FDA or the National Institutes of Health to
actively support pharmaceutical safety centers of excellence. The Centers for Education and
Research of Therapeutics (CERTs) program that was recently disbanded might be a strong
candidate for reinstating.[19] Consistent with existing qualitative research studies on barriers
to reporting adverse drug reactions, these initiatives do not require additional clinician time or
do not result in additional clinician burden.
This study has limitations. We focused on published case series of severe adverse drug reac-
tions that had been investigated by SONAR or RADAR investigators or close collaborators of
RADAR or SONAR investigators. These investigators were located at> 50 universities, hospi-
tals, safety organization, or Veterans Administration medical centers. Interview materials
obtained from these individuals included highly sensitive personal information that would be
difficult to obtain from other clinicians. Our findings therefore may not be generalizable to
other clinicians who evaluate serious adverse drug reactions and publish these findings in the
peer-reviewed medical literature. Responses to queries about motivation to pursue the scien-
tific investigation may reflect a socially desirable response bias. Finally, recall bias may affect
interviewees’ responses.
Conclusions
Our study provides some of the first reports of clinician motivations and experiences with
reporting serious or potentially fatal oncology-associated adverse drug or device reactions.
Overall, it appears that negative feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers and mixed
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feedback from the academic community and/or the FDA were identified by clinicians who
participated in this study. “Big data,” registries, Data Safety Monitoring Boards, and pharma-
cogenetic studies may facilitate improved pharmacovigilance efforts for oncology-associated
adverse drug reactions.[20,21] These initiatives overcome concerns related to complacency,
indifference, ignorance, and system-level problems as barriers to documenting and reporting
adverse drug events- barriers that have been previously reported for clinician reporting of seri-
ous adverse drug reactions. [16,17,19]
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